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Abstract
This article examines arbitrage investment in a mispriced asset when
the mispricing follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and a credit-constrained
investor maximizes a generalization of the Kelly criterion. The optimal
differentiable and threshold policies are derived. The optimal differen-
tiable policy is linear with respect to mispricing and risk-free in the long
run. The optimal threshold policy calls for investing immediately when
the mispricing is greater than zero with the investment amount inversely
proportional to the risk aversion parameter. The investment is risky even
in the long run. The results are consistent with the belief that credit-
constrained arbitrageurs should be risk-neutral if they are to engage in
convergence trading.
Myron [Scholes] once told me they are sucking up nickels from
all over the world. But because they are so leveraged that amounts
to a lot of money.
Merton Miller about the essence of arbitrage.
1 Introduction
Arbitrageurs are people who detect inconsistencies in asset prices and invest in
them hoping that the inconsistencies will be eliminated. The waiting time is
often uncertain and since the arbitrageur depends on the willingness of other
people to lend him money, the irrationality of creditors may lead to great de-
bacles long before prices converge to consistent values. The notorious story of
the arbitrage fund LTCM that lost 90 percent of its value on “riskless” deals
illustrates the importance of credit constraints. So what policy should the ar-
bitrageur pursue when creditors impose borrowing constraints? In particular,
can the arbitrageur allocate the available funds in such a way as to eliminate
all the long-run risk?
If this risk elimination is possible, the mispricings should be equally attrac-
tive to risk-averse as well as risk-neutral investors. However, a popular view
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asserts that arbitrageurs, unlike other investors, should be risk-neutral. Is there
any ground for this belief? The present article provides a justification by solving
for arbitrageurs’ optimal policies under several types of constraints and showing
that under some of them the long-run risk cannot be eliminated. Risk-averse
investors that face those constraints are not interested in small mispricings.
The paper investigates two classes of constraints that lead to strikingly dif-
ferent results. Under constraints from the first class, the arbitrageur can only
change the leverage slowly. In practice, borrowing additional funds takes time:
The arbitrageur must apply for new credit, provide an explanation why he needs
it and wait for a decision. Depending on the situation, the process might take
from several minutes to several days. In addition a rapid increase in a position
adversely affects prices, so in their own interests arbitrageurs must accumulate
positions slowly.
For this class of policies, the main result is that the optimal policy is linear in
the mispricing, and independent of the coefficient of risk aversion. The variance
of the portfolio wealth does not grow with time. Thus, under this constraint
the long-run risk can be expunged.
Constraints of the second type are stronger: The arbitrageur cannot change
leverage except by closing the position. The motivation is that the arbitrageur
is often restricted in his ability to change the leverage – even if the need arises.
Higher leverage is mostly needed when mispricing is increasing and the invest-
ment account shows negative performance. Unfortunately, this is the worst time
to ask for new credit because the creditors hate to invest in accounts with neg-
ative performance. As Mark Twain said: “A banker is a fellow who lends you
his umbrella when the sun is shining but wants it back the minute it rains.”
For policies in this class, the main result is that the long-run risk cannot be
completely removed. Consequently, the arbitrageur will invest an amount that
is inversely proportional to his risk aversion.
These two examples suggest that what makes the convergence arbitrage risky
in the long run is the inability of the arbitrageur to change the investment
amount after the investment is committed. In particular, the results of the
second example are consistent with the belief that arbitrageurs should be risk-
neutral if they are to engage in convergence trading.
The results of the present paper match closely with results of Grossman and Vila (1992),
who study the dynamic investment under a constraint on investment amount.
They find that the constraint essentially makes the investor behave as if he
were more risk-averse than he actually is. Unlike in the present paper, however,
the asset process is not mean-reverting in Grossman and Vila (1992), so the in-
vestor could not hope to eliminate the risk completely. Also the constraint is
not exogenous as in the present paper but a function of the investor’s wealth.
Because of these differences it is difficult to conclude whether the similarity of
results is incidental or not. Both papers, however, support the view that certain
constraints increase long-run riskiness of investment projects.
In a recent paper about convergence trading, Liu and Longstaff (2000) use
the Brownian bridge to model the mispricing process, an assumption on the
process that requires a fixed horizon at which the mispricing will be effaced. By
2
the nature of their model, they cannot draw conclusions about long-run risks
but they do find that arbitrageurs sometimes cannot eliminate all risk at the
end of the arbitrage period. This result is consistent with results of the present
paper.
Closely related is the literature on optimal dynamic investments with risky
assets. The seminal contributions to this literature were made in Samuelson (1969),
Merton (1969), Merton (1971) and Merton (1973). Optimal investment in as-
sets that follow a diffusion process with mean-reverting returns was analyzed in
Kim and Omberg (1996), Brennan et al. (1997), Campbell and Viceira (1999),
Barberis (2000), Wachter (2002), Campbell et al. (2003). The focus of the present
paper is not on general risky investments but on the optimal extraction of profit
from near arbitrage opportunities. Concequently, the paper comes to more def-
inite conclusions by using a generalization of the Kelly investment criterion,
which emphasizes the long-run behavior of portfolios and especially suitable to
modelling objectives of large institutional traders.
In addition, this paper computes the optimal leverage using a new method.
While Kim and Omberg ingeniously solve dynamic programming equations by
reducing them to a system of non-linear ordinary differential equations, Camp-
bell and Viceira derive an approximate solution by linearization of Euler equa-
tions, and Wachter uses the martingale method of Cox and Huang (1989) to
separate consumption and financing decisions, the present paper derives the so-
lution by methods of stochastic control, taking the advantage of the asymptotic
investment criteria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Sections 3 and 4 derive the optimal differentiable and threshold policies and de-
scribe their properties. Section 5 compares results for differentiable and thresh-
old policies and concludes.
2 Model
An investor can invest in a mispriced asset whose mispricing is measured by
x = ln(p1/p2). Here p1 and p2 are the asset’s actual and “correct” prices,
respectively. Mispricing follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
dxt = −αxtdt+ σdzt, (1)
where xt is mispricing at time t, zt is a standard Wiener process, σ > 0 and
α > 0. Parameter α measures the speed of reversion to the correct price: The
higher α is, the faster mispricing x drifts towards zero. Parameter σ measures
the size of new mispricing shocks introduced into the process. It is also useful
to define Σ = σ2/(2α), which is the variance of xt in the long run.
Changes in mispricing induce changes in the arbitrageur’s wealth through
his choice of the leverage coefficient f(x): The change in the logarithm of wealth
is the product of the leverage coefficient and the change in the mispricing,
du = f(x)dx. (2)
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Intuitively, a 1% change in the mispricing results in a f(x)% change in the in-
vestor’s wealth. Later we will impose certain restriction on the available lever-
age.
The arbitrageur’s utility is a linear combination of the growth rates in the
expectation and variance of the portfolio wealth:
U = lim inf
t→∞
1
t
[E(ut)− γVar(ut)] , (3)
where parameter γ measures risk aversion of the investor. The optimization
problem is to choose the leverage function f(x) so that utility U is maximized.
What is the meaning of this maximization criterion? If γ is 0, then the
criterion is the same as the criterion of maximizing the portfolio’s long-run
growth rate – the Kelly criterion. When γ > 0, it introduces an additional
term penalizing deviations from the expected growth rate. This additional term
assures the investor that maximizing U protects him against the large deviations
in the realized growth of his portfolio from the expectations.
An example may perhaps add some insight into the investment criterion.
Suppose that the wealth of the investor follows a geometric Brownian motion
with constant parameters µ and σ. Then the utility of the investor is
U = µ− γσ2. (4)
This expression shows that the utility depends only on the parameters of the
process and on risk aversion but not on the investment horizon.
Another way to get an insight into this criterion is to compare it with the
objective under the classical single period Markowitz model. In the Markowitz
model the investor maximizes a linear combination of the expectation and the
variance of the portfolio return. Therefore, the present model generalizes the
Markowitz model to the dynamic setting by substituting the expectation and
variance of the single period return with the asymptotic rates of increase in
expectation and variance of the investor’s wealth.
An important assumption that we adopt in this generalization is that the
investor is concerned only with long-run consequences of his policy. This as-
sumption simplifies the analysis considerably and appears to be realistic for
small investments by large institutions. In using this assumption we follow
Bielecki and Pliska (1999) and Bielecki et al. (2000), who applied it to the anal-
ysis of continuous investment policies in a similar situation.
3 Optimal Differentiable Policy
This section is about differentiable policies f(x), for which
f ∈ C1(−∞,+∞), and (5)
|f ′(x)| 6 K. (6)
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The policies from this class will be called D−policies. This class excludes poli-
cies that prescribe extremely rapid growth of leverage with respect to mispric-
ing. The following theorem is a cardinal ingredient in showing that optimal
D−policies are linear.
Theorem 3.1 Linear investment policies are the only D−policies such that the
variance of the logarithm of wealth ut is asymptotically constant.
The proof uses a convenient representation for u: Let
g(ξ) =:
∫ ξ
0
f(ζ)dζ. (7)
Then it is easy to check that
ut = u0 + g(xt)− g(x0)− σ
2
2
∫ t
0
f ′(xτ )dτ . (8)
The intuition behind this representation is simple. The investor can increase
his wealth only if he increases his leverage when the mispricing increases. The
derivative f ′(x) measures the sensitivity of the leverage policy to mispricing,
and (8) shows that the change in the logarithm of wealth equals a multiple of
the integral of f ′(x) plus a stationary process. The more sensitive the leverage
policy is to mispricing, the greater the increase in the wealth induced by local
variations in mispricing. The addition of g(xt) − g(x0) reflects dependence of
the wealth on the initial and final conditions.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Taking the variance of ut − u0 in (8) gives
Var(ut−u0) = Var (g(xt))−σ2Cov
(
g(xt),
∫ t
0
f ′(xτ )dτ
)
+
σ4
4
Var
(∫ t
0
f ′(xτ )dτ
)
.
(9)
As t increases, all terms except possibly the third one tend to a finite limit. So,
asymptotically,
Var(ut) ∼ const + σ
4
4
rt, (10)
where
r =: lim
t→∞
Var
∫ t
0
f ′(xτ )dτ
t
≥ 0. (11)
The rate r = 0 if and only if Var(f ′(x)) = 0. Indeed, if Var(f ′(x)) > 0 then
r(t) =
1
t
Var(f ′(x))
∫ t
0
∫ t
0
Corr(f ′(xτ ), f
′(xs))dτds. (12)
According to Proposition A.1 in Appendix A, Corr(f ′(xτ ), f
′(xs)) > 0, so it
follows from (12) that
r(t) >
1
t
Var(f ′(x))
∫ t
0
1dτ = Var(f ′(x)) > 0. (13)
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Finally, since Var(f ′(x)) = 0 if and only if f ′(x) is almost surely constant,
the investment policy must be linear if the variance of ut is not to increase with
time. QED.
Theorem 3.1 shows that all linear strategies eliminate long-run risk. As a
natural consequence, the next theorem predicates optimality of linear strategies
with respect to the asymptotic investment criterion. The idea is to match any
non-linear strategy with an admissible linear strategy that has higher expected
return and lower growth in variance. The matching is possible exactly because
all linear strategies have zero asymptotic growth in variance.
Theorem 3.2 For the investor with asymptotic preferences, any D−policy is
dominated by some linear D−policy.
Proof: Let the non-linear policy be f(x). According to (8), in the long run
E(ut) = u0 − σ
2
2
E(f ′(x))t. (14)
Take the linear policy fL(x) = (E(f
′(x)) − ε)x with ε > 0. For a certain ε
it is admissible. This is because |E(f ′(x)) − ε| < K follows from |f ′(x)| ≤ K
everywhere and |f ′(x)| < K on a set of positive measure, which are both true
because f is a non-linear D−policy. The expectation of the logarithm of wealth
under fL is
E(ut) = u0 − σ
2
2
E(f ′(x))t +
σ2
2
εt. (15)
It is clearly higher than the corresponding expectation for the non-linear policy.
From Theorem 3.1 we know that the variance of ut is asymptotically constant for
linear policies and is asymptotically equivalent to rt, where r > 0, for non-linear
policies. It follows that for sufficiently large T the linear policy fL will have
lower Var(uT ) than the non-linear policy f . Thus fL asymptotically dominates
f . QED.
It remains to find the optimal policy in the class of linear policies. It turns
out that it is the policy that has the maximal sensitivity to mispricing. This is
intuitively clear because every linear strategy eliminates the long-run risk, and
the policy with the largest sensitivity to mispricing has the highest expected
return. Formally, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.3 The optimal linear D−policy is f(x) = −Kx.
Proof: it is easy to compute
lim
t→∞
E(ut)
t
=
σ2
2
k,
lim
t→∞
Var(ut)
t
= 0,
U =
σ2
2
k.
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Thus, the utility is maximized by the maximal possible k, from which the the-
orem follows. QED.
The theorem implies that the arbitrageur should increase the leverage at the
maximal possible rate. In particular, the optimal strategy does not depend on
the risk aversion parameter or properties of the mispricing process. The intuitive
meaning of this conclusion is that the appropriate use of leverage allows the
arbitrageur to eliminate all the long run risk. As the next section shows, this
conclusion will be reversed if the arbitrageur is more constrained in the use of
leverage.
4 Optimal Threshold Policy
When an arbitrageur uses threshold policies he keeps his finger on a button
that triggers investment while looking at the computer monitor and waiting for
a mispricing. If he observes a mispricing that exceeds a threshold, S, he pushes
the button and a fixed amount, L, is directed to this opportunity. When the
mispricing falls below another threshold, s, he pushes another button and the
position closes. Leverage L never changes when the position is opened. Simple
threshold policies have equal thresholds: S = s.
As was said in the Introduction, arbitrageurs use threshold policies because
they often cannot secure additional funds for positions they already opened.
They also favor threshold policies because these policies allow economizing on
transaction costs.
General threshold policies are complicated to analyze. Fortunately, the fol-
lowing theorem shows that it is sufficient to study simple threshold policies.
Theorem 4.1 Any threshold policy is dominated by a simple threshold policy.
This theorem is given without proof. Intuitively, for the Markov process of
mispricing the optimal investment policy should not depend on the history of
investing, and the only threshold policies that pass this selection test are simple
threshold policies. Indeed, if s < S, and the mispricing is between s and S, then
the position is open if the mispricing has fallen from above S but not yet gone
below s, and it is closed if the mispricing has risen from below s but not yet
gone above S. It follows that investment under the threshold rule with s 6= S
depends on history of investment and therefore cannot be optimal.
The relevant properties of the simple threshold policies are described in the
next theorem, which uses the following notation:
φ(S) =
1√
2πΣ
exp
(
−S
2
2Σ
)
, (16)
ψ(S) =
1√
2πΣ
2
α
∫ 1
0
1
ξ
[
1√
1− ξ2
exp
(
S2
Σ
ξ
1 + ξ
)
− 1
]
dξ. (17)
For S = 0, the value of ψ(S) can be computed explicitly: ψ(0) = 2 ln 2/(α
√
2πΣ).
7
[Figure 1 here]
Figure 1: Plots of Optimal Leverage L as Function of Threshold S
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2: Plots of Optimal Utility U as Function of Threshold S
Theorem 4.2 For the simple threshold policy with threshold S and leverage L
lim
t→∞
E(ut − u0)
t
= c1(L, S) ≡ σ2Lφ(S)
lim
t→∞
Var(ut − u0)
t
= c2(L, S) ≡ (σ2Lφ(S))2ψ(S).
The investor’s utility is U(L, S) = c1(L, S)− γc2(L, S).
The proof is relegated to Appendix B.
The first step in obtaining the optimal policy from this theorem is to calcu-
late reduced utility function that depends only on threshold S :
Corollary 1 For a fixed threshold S the optimal leverage is
L(S) =
1
4γαΣφ(S)ψ(S)
and the corresponding utility is
U(S) =
1
4γψ(S)
.
The functions L(S) and U(S) are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. We can
see that higher long-run variance Σ leads to an increase in both leverage L and
utility U . Higher persistence of the process does not change optimal leverage
but decreases utility.
The function ψ(S) is increasing in S2, and consequently the maximal utility
is reached at S = 0. The optimal threshold policy is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Utility is maximized for S = 0 and L = π/(4γ ln 2). The optimal
utility is U = α
√
2πΣ/(8γ ln 2).
Predictably, the utility is higher when the convergence is fast (α is high)
and the arbitrage opportunity is large (Σ is high). Not so predictable is that
the optimal leverage does not depend on the parameters of the process: This
leverage optimally balances risk and return for every Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pro-
cess. What is most important, however, is that the optimal leverage depends
on the parameter of the risk aversion γ. The higher γ is, the lower the amount
is that the arbitrageur is willing to commit to the arbitrage opportunity: The
arbitrageur that uses only threshold strategies is unable to remove the long-run
risk and must adjust his behavior.
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[Table 1 here]
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Mispricing Factor
[Table 2 here]
Table 2: Results of Estimation of Mispricing Factor Process
5 Empirical Application
This section studies convergent trading in the context of WEBS, which are
shares of open-end mutual funds that replicate the price performance of foreign
stock market indexes. WEBS trade on a stock exchange like ordinary stock, and
their managers try to keep the fund price close to the net asset value (NAV) of
their underlying stocks. They buy back shares if the price is less then NAV and
issue additional shares if the price is greater than NAV.
As in previous sections, I assume that the investor can hedge the risk of the
underlying portfolio. Indeed, trading index futures provides a very good hedge
of country exposure. Absense of the perfect hedge limits the implications of my
analysis.
I use price and NAV daily data for WEBS that track indices of Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. This is a total of 17 countries. The data start in March of 1996 and
end in August of 2000, which gives around 1000 datapoints for each country.
The mispricing factor xt is computed as the logarithm of the ratio of the
price to NAV. Some summary statistics for xt are given in Table 1. I model the
dynamic of the mispricing factor as an AR(1) process, which is the discrete-time
counterpart to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
xt = βxt−1 + σǫt, (18)
The results of estimation of this process are summarized in Table 2. They
show that β is around 0.5, and σ is around 0.01. Durbin-Watson statistic shows
that the AR(1) process is a reasonably good approximation to the true mispricng
process.
Our first goal is to get an estimate of the order of the coefficient k in the
optimal linear strategy. Let us use the following estimates of the order of pa-
rameters: σ2 ∼ 10−4, α ∼ 0.5. From Theorem 3.3, the long-run variance of the
logarithm of wealth is 5 · 10−9k2, and the expected change in the logarithm of
wealth is 5 · 10−5k per day. The average daily change in the logarithm of the
S&P500 index has been 8 ·10−4 ∼ 10−3 in the last five years. To get this return
by convergent trading, the sensitivity k of the linear strategy would have to be
set at 20. The corresponding asymptotic variance of the logarithm of wealth
would then be 2 · 10−8. This is considerably smaller than the variance of the
deviation of the logarithm of the S&P500 index from its linear trend, which for
9
[Figure 3 here]
Figure 3: Contour Graph of Mean of Average Daily Returns
[Figure 4 here]
Figure 4: Contour Graph of Standard Deviation of Average Daily Returns
the 5-year period from August 1995 to August 2000 can be estimated at about
3 · 10−3.
These computations suggest that this market could not be efficient if trans-
actions costs were absent. The goal of the following Monte-Carlo simulations is
to analyze properties of threshold strategies and to find the optimal threshold
strategy in situations with transaction costs. I assume that the transaction cost
c is 0.25%, and that the true process of discounts is AR(1) with β = 0.3 and
σ = 10−2.
The simulations were organized as follows. One hundred realizations of the
mispricing factor process were generated. Each realization had 1250 datapoints.
For each realization I simulated the process of investing according to a strategy
from a finites set of threshold strategies. Thus, each pair of a strategy and a
realization of the mispricing factor process resulted in a realization of wealth
process.
For each realization of wealth process, I calculated the average daily return
as a difference between logarithm of final wealth and logarithm of initial wealth
divided by the length of the realization. After that, I calculated the mean and
the variance of this statistic over all realizations of the wealth process that
corresponded to a particular strategy. Thus, as a final product I had a function
that mapped each strategy into the expectation and variance of the average
daily return.
I used the following set of strategies. A rise in the mispricing over a threshold
S triggers the opening of the position. When the mispicing returns to the region
below s ∈ [0, S], the arbitrageur closes his position and waits for a new trigger
signal. The threshold S was chosen in the range from 0.5% to 2%. The threshold
s was chosen in the range from S + c to 0%.
Figure 3 is a contour graph of the mean of the average daily return to a
strategy. On the vertical axis of the graph is the low threshold S and on the
horizontal axis is the difference between high and low thresholds S−s. They are
denominated in percentage terms. The lines on the contour graph correspond
to the strategies that have the same mean of average daily return.
This graph suggests that the average return is maximized for s = 0 and S
[Figure 5 here]
Figure 5: Contour Graph of Sharpe Ratio
10
set to some S0 > c. Therefore, if the investor wants to maximize average return
he should invest only if the mispricing exceeds the transaction cost by some
markup.
Figure 4 is a contour graph of the standard deviation of the average daily
returns. We can conclude from it that the variance is increasing with an increase
in the absolute value of the low threshold and with an increase in the difference
between the thresholds.
Figure 5 is a countour graph of the ratio of the mean of average daily return
to its standard deviation. It suggests that the ratio is maximized for the strategy
that sets s = 0 and S = c. Thus an investor who uses only threshold strategies
and who wants to maximize the Sharpe ratio should invest immediately when
the mispricing exceeds his transaction costs.
6 Discussion
Section 3 shows that in the class of differentiable policies with bounded deriva-
tive the optimal policy is linear in the mispricing and the coefficient in the linear
relationship is the highest possible. The optimal strategy in this case does not
depend on the risk-aversion of the arbitrageur, and all the long-run risk can be
eliminated.
In contrast, according to the results of Section 4, if only threshold policies are
available then the long-run risk is unavoidable and the investment is inversely
proportional to risk aversion. This conclusion is consistent with the belief that
arbitrageurs are typically risk-neutral. The suggested reason for this belief is
that the constraints on flexibility of changes in leverage make the convergence
trading risky even in the long run.
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A Auxiliary Statistical Result
Suppose that x and y are jointly Gaussian random variables, Var(x) = Var(y) =
1, and Cov(x, y) = β.
Proposition A.1 If f ∈ D and Var(f(x)) = 1, then Cov(f(x), f(y)) ∈ [0, β].
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that Ef(x) = 0. Since Hermite
polynomials are complete in the class of D−policies, we can use them to ap-
proximate f . Then the assertion of Proposition A.1 follows from Proposition
A.2.
Proposition A.2 If f is a polynomial of degree N , Ef(x) = 0 and Var(f(x)) =
1, then Cov(f(x), f(y)) ∈ [βN , β]. The maximum and minimum are achieved
by f(x) = x and f(x) = HN (x), respectively, where HN (x) is the Hermite
polynomial of degree N.
Proof: Represent f(x) as a sum of Hermite polynomials:
f(x) =
N∑
1
akHk(x), (19)
where by definition
Hk(x) = exp
(
x2
2
)
(−1)k
k!
dk
(dx)k
[
exp
(
−x
2
2
)]
. (20)
Hermite polynomials form an orthonormal system with respect to the Gaussian
kernel and possess the following useful property:
Cov(Hi(x), Hj(y)) = β
iδij . (21)
Using this property and orthonormality, we can write
Cov(f(x), f(y)) =
N∑
1
a2kβ
k (22)
Var(f(x)) =
N∑
1
a2k. (23)
From (22) and (23), the maximum of Cov(f(x), f(y)) is β and it is achieved by
f(x) = H1(x) = x. The minimum is β
N and it is achieved by f(x) = HN (x).
QED.
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B Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof: By definition, the threshold policy is
f(x) =
{
−sign(x)L if |x| ≥ S,
0 if |x| < S. (24)
The generalized Ito formula gives
ut = u0 + g(xt)− g(x0) + σ
2
2
2L
∫ t
0
δS(xτ )dτ , (25)
where δS is the Dirac delta-function and
g(ξ) =:
∫ ξ
0
f(ζ)dζ. (26)
The intuition behind this representation is simple: The investor increases his
wealth only when he triggers the policy. The number of times the policy is
triggered is stochastic and measured by the integral of the delta function. The
profit earned at each occasion is proportional to the product of local volatility
σ2 and leverage L. Finally, there is a dependence of wealth on initial and final
conditions which is captured by g(xt)− g(x0).
Since g(xt) does not grow with time, the arbitrageur’s utility depends only
on the moments of the integral of the delta function:∫ t
0
δS(xτ ) dτ . (27)
The first step in the computation of the moments is calculating the expecta-
tion and covariance function of the generalized stochastic process δt,S =: δS(xt).
The joint density of xt1 and xt2 is
p(x1, x2) =
1
2πΣ
√
1− a(τ )2 exp
{
− 1
2Σ
(
x1
x2
)′(
1 a(τ)
a(τ ) 1
)−1(
x1
x2
)}
, (28)
where τ = t2−t1 and a(τ ) = e−α|τ |. The delta function can be approximated by
1
∆χ[S,S+∆], where χA denotes the characteristic function of set A and ∆ limits
to 0. Then, computing two first moments for χ[S,S+∆](xt) and taking the limit
∆→ 0 give the following formulas:
E(δt1,S) =
1√
2πΣ
exp
(
−S
2
2Σ
)
and (29)
E(δt1,Sδt2,S) =
1
2πΣ
√
1− a(τ )2 exp
(
−S
2
Σ
1
1 + a(τ )
)
. (30)
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For example, equality (30) can be seen from the following calculation:
E(δt1,Sδt2,S) = lim
∆→0
1
∆2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
χ[S,S+∆](ξ1)χ[S,S+∆](ξ2)p(ξ1, ξ2)dξ1dξ2
= lim
∆→0
1
2πΣ
√
1− a(τ )2
1
∆2
∫ S+∆
S
∫ S+∆
S
exp
[
−ξ
2
1 + ξ
2
2 − 2a(τ)ξ1ξ2
2Σ(1− a(τ )2)
]
dξ1dξ2
=
1
2πΣ
√
1− a(τ )2 exp
(
−S
2
Σ
1
1 + a(τ )
)
.
(31)
From (29) and (30) it follows that
Cov(δt1,S , δt2,S) =
1
2πΣ
√
1− a(τ )2 exp
(
−S
2
Σ
1
1 + a(τ )
)
− 1
2πΣ
exp
(
−S
2
Σ
)
.
(32)
Since Cov(δt1,S , δt2,S) depends only on τ = t2− t1, it can be denoted by ϑ(τ , S).
Next,
Var
(∫ T
0
δt,S dt
)
= 2
∫ T
0
dt1
∫ T
t1
Cov(δt1,S, δt2,S)dt2
(substituting τ = t2 − t1) = 2
∫ T
0
dt1
∫ T−t1
0
ϑ(τ , S)dτ
(changing order of integration) = 2
∫ T
0
(T − τ )ϑ(τ , S)dτ .
(33)
Since ϑ(τ , S) = O(e−cτ ) for a positive c and τ →∞, and ϑ(τ , S) is integrable
around τ = 0, it follows ∫ T
0
ϑ(τ , S)dτ → const and
∫ T
0
τϑ(τ , S)dτ → const
as T →∞.
So, for large T
Var
(∫ T
0
δt,S dt
)
∼ 2T
∫ ∞
0
ϑ(τ , S)dτ
= 2T
1
2πΣ
exp
(
−S
2
Σ
)∫ ∞
0
(
1√
1− a(τ )2 exp
(
S2
Σ
a(τ )
1 + a(τ)
)
− 1
)
dτ
(substituting τ = −α−1 ln ξ)
= 2T
1
2πΣ
exp
(
−S
2
Σ
)
1
α
∫ 1
0
1
ξ
(
1√
1− ξ2
exp
(
S2
Σ
ξ
1 + ξ
)
− 1
)
dξ
= φ(S)2ψ(S)T.
(34)
14
This implies all the assertions of the theorem. QED.
15
References
Barberis, N. (2000). Investing for the long run when returns are predictable.
Journal of Finance 55 (1), 225–264.
Bielecki, T. R. and S. R. Pliska (1999). Risk sensitive dynamic asset manage-
ment. Journal of Applied Mathematics and Optimization 39, 337–360.
Bielecki, T. R., S. R. Pliska, and M. Sherris (2000). Risk sensitive asset allo-
cation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24, 1145–1177.
Brennan, M. J., E. S. Schwartz, and R. Lagnado (1997). Strategic asset allo-
cation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21, 1377–1403.
Campbell, J. Y., Y. L. Chan, and L. M. Viceira (2003). A multivariate model
of strategic asset allocation. Journal of Financial Economics 67 (1), 41–80.
Campbell, J. Y. and L. Viceira (1999). Consumption and portfolio deci-
sions when expected returns are time- varying. Quaterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 114, 433–495.
Cox, J. and C. Huang (1989). Optimal consumption and portfolio policies
when asset prices follow a diffusion process. Journal of Economic The-
ory 39, 33–83.
Grossman, S. J. and J.-L. Vila (1992, June). Optimal dynamic trading
with leverage constraints. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Anal-
ysis 27 (2), 151–168.
Kim, T. S. and E. Omberg (1996, Spring). Dynamic nonmyopic portfolio
behavior. The Review of Financial Studies 9 (1), 141–161.
Liu, J. and F. A. Longstaff (2000, June). Losing money on arbitrages: Op-
timal dynamic portfolio choices in markets with arbitrage opportunities.
Anderson School at UCLA, Working Paper.
Merton, R. C. (1969, August). Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty:
the continuous time case. The Review of Economics and Statistics 51 (3),
247–257.
Merton, R. C. (1971). Optimal consumption and portfolio rules in a
continuous-time model. Journal of Economic Theory 3, 213–214.
Merton, R. C. (1973). An interpemporal capital asset pricing model. Econo-
metrica 41, 867–887.
Samuelson, P. (1969). Lifetime portfolio selection by dynamic stochastic pro-
gramming. Review of Economics and Statistics 51, 239–246.
Wachter, J. A. (2002). Portfolio and consumption decisions under mean-
reverting returns: An exact solution for complete markets. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37 (1), 63–91.
16
